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ABSTRACT 
This research compares federal and state approaches to managing disaster medical surge. 
The comparison identifies the varieties of regulations, assets, and response methods 
available for federal and state responses to mass casualty incidents, from which local 
communities can develop plans and acquire resources to create a seamless disaster 
medical care system. 
Following a disaster, survivors self-evacuate or are transported by EMS to a 
nearby hospital. Arrival of disaster survivors, combined with an often high daily number 
of non-disaster patients leaves the facility overwhelmed both in terms of medical 
resources and personnel. The lack of local resources to manage the incident may require 
state and federal assets to be deployed. The time it takes for the additional resources to 
arrive from outside the area leaves the facility unable to respond effectively for hours and 
even days. 
A whole community approach to medical surge management organized by a 
collaborative regional healthcare coalition may provide a solution. Such a coalition can 
engage stakeholders to assess and manage resources (space, staff, and stuff) and develop 
surge response plans that will integrate with state and federal resources when needed.  
Seamless coordination will minimize the complexities of medical surge needs and lead to 
doing the best for the most. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Natural and manmade disasters can be severe enough to cause multiple casualties. The 
number of survivors requiring medical care can overwhelm a healthcare system. The 
surge of disaster survivors entering the healthcare system causes the demand for 
resources to exceed the supply. A shortage of supplies and medical staff leaves those in 
need of care to wait and risk the potential of a poor patient outcome. During a disaster, 
entry into the healthcare system is most often through the emergency department of the 
closest hospital. To compensate for the surge into these facilities, hospitals may institute 
disaster protocols to move supplies and staff to the emergency department. They may 
also delay or cancel previously planned and scheduled elective medical procedures. This 
shift of resources may mitigate the surge in necessary treatment, but large disasters can 
easily overwhelm the capacity of any single facility to meet both existing and new needs.  
Disasters like Hurricane Katrina and the attack on the World Trade Center 
demonstrated the importance of managing disaster medical surge. In response, the 
Federal Government has provided funding and guidance to States to develop plans for 
building medical response teams, acquiring medical supply and equipment caches, and 
building expanded capacity. Some States have built mobile hospitals to help augment 
healthcare capacity and capability during a disaster induced medical surge. States have 
also collaborated by entering into mutual aid agreements and interstate compacts to share 
resources during disasters. 
Still the response time for State and Federal resources to reach local hospitals and 
clinics may reach days. Until then, the burden for managing medical surge rests squarely 
with the capabilities and responsibilities of local healthcare systems. 
The development of local Disaster Healthcare Coalitions can be valuable for the 
whole community to collectively access medical resources. This is especially important 
during the first hours to days when a local community is managing medical surge or 
awaiting State and Federal resources to arrive. Local Alternate Care Sites can manage 
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medical surge by providing non-complex medical care to patients away from the hospital, 
leaving valuable space and resources for the most critical at the hospital. 
This thesis reviews the literature that aims to provide guidance, frameworks and 
directives for managing disaster medical surge. It compares what this literature indicates 
is available among federal agencies and state level medical departments to help identify 
how local management of survivors of catastrophic disasters may be the most effective 
and efficient approach to handling medical surges.  
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Present public health and medical preparedness plans incorporate the 
concept of “surging” existing medical and public health capabilities in 
response to an event that threatens a large number of lives.  The 
assumption that conventional public health and medical systems can 
function effectively in catastrophic health events has, however, proved 
to be incorrect in real- world situations.  Therefore, it is necessary to 
transform the national approach to health care in the context of a 
catastrophic health event in order to enable U.S. public health and medical 
systems to respond effectively to a broad range of incidents. (HSPD-21, 
2007) 
A. OVERVIEW 
This research provides alternatives for the management of medical resources to 
lessen the impact of disaster medical surge which can become overwhelming on a 
communities healthcare system. Natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina or manmade 
disasters like the World Trade Center cause multiple casualties to simultaneously seek 
medical care from the local healthcare system. The surge of patients becomes 
problematic as the demand for medical supplies, staff and space may exceed the available 
supply. To manage surge and build healthcare system capability and capacity requires 
commitment, communication, and coordination of local, state, and federal resources. 
In 2003, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) created a 
benchmark for hospitals which identified the need for bed capacity of five hundred (500) 
per million population for the acutely ill requiring hospitalization from a bioterrorist 
incident. To meet the benchmark requires the burden of medical surge management to be 
placed on the whole community not one facility or healthcare system. It is not sufficient 
for healthcare facilities to develop individual disaster plans without coordination within 
the healthcare delivery system.  Communities should carefully and creatively examine 
their current assets and expand upon existing relationships to build response capability 
(Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 2005). 
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Disaster healthcare coalitions representing stakeholders within the whole 
community can provide the platform to develop surge plans. The plans can identify 
strategies to utilize pooled medical resources and define the integration with state and 
federal plans. A key element to managing medical surge is the seamless coordination of 
plans across the local, state and federal levels. To rapidly deploy and effectively manage 
medical surge requires collaboration and efficient planning. Success for managing 
medical surge is measured by providing the best care for the most patients.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, 85 percent of the patients 
arriving at New York City hospitals sustained minor injuries classified as the walking 
wounded. Of the rest, 13 percent underwent surgical procedures, with an overall critical 
mortality rate of 37.5 percent. During disasters, those with minor injuries, often self-
evacuate from the scene and arrive at the hospital before the more severely injured can 
be transported by ambulance. Those with minor injuries are classified as the walking 
wounded and do not require complex surgical procedures or specialized equipment. In 
fact, the walking wounded may be moved outside the hospital emergency department to a 
less acute healthcare setting or to an alternate care site. 
Shifting patients to an Alternate Care Site (ACS) leaves available bed space at the 
hospital for the critically injured arriving by Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 
ambulances. The time EMS takes on scene to triage and carefully package patients allows 
self-evacuees to create a bottleneck that limits the hospitals capacity and capability to 
manage the disaster. Healthcare systems without disaster medical surge plans and without 
mutual aid agreements can become unable to provide care once overwhelmed. 
Healthcare organizations have long recognized that in an emergency situation, 
institutions and agencies must work with each other and with first responder and public 
safety organizations and with the public to manage the casualties (Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 2005). As the Joint Commission has argued, 
coordination of emergency healthcare services across a community can lessen the impact 
of surge on individual facilities. It becomes a difficult task when during a disaster there 
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are no clearly defined plans for community collaboration and coordination. The reality 
from lessons of past disaster is that communities will be on their own for the first 24–
72 hours before receiving outside assistance. It is therefore important to recognize the 
causes of medical surge, and  build partnerships that can develop plans and include the 
use of alternate sites for care and methods of care to minimize the impact of disaster 
medical surge on the healthcare system (Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations 2005). 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Following are research questions to take into consideration. 
 What are alternatives for medical surge management during a disaster? 
 How can alternate care sites improve the capacity and/or capability of a 
healthcare system during a disaster? 
 Would using an alternate care site for medical surge, challenge 
community and healthcare system policies, procedures, practices, and 
regulations? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The research for this thesis involved a review of literature accessed through 
Internet searches, federal and state Websites, and library holdings of books and journals.  
Documents related to medical surge, building healthcare capacity and capability, and 
coordination of state and federal level resources. The intent was to explore disaster 
response and resource management for the ability to augment local healthcare systems 
during medical surge. A comparative analysis of the literature was conducted to identify 
policies, guidelines, plans, and assets that could lessen disaster medical surge on the U.S. 
healthcare system. 
The resources deemed most important to evaluate include the following: the 
nature of the asset (state or federal), how it becomes activated, the number of personnel, 




considerations for using the asset. Each element is examined to determine the rand for 
alternate methods that could be used to provide medical care during disaster medical 
surge that exists outside the daily operations of healthcare systems. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The goal of this study is to identify available federal and state assets and 
implement effective and efficient strategies to increase disaster medical surge capacity 
and capability in healthcare systems. Planning for, responding to and recovering from 
medical surge through the effective use of space, stuff and staff improves healthcare 
organization resiliency.
1
 There is no one coordination model that mitigates medical surge 
rather the analysis shows the need to efficiently and effectively manage and utilize all 
available resources within a local, regional and federal medical system. The thesis 
highlights healthcare options, the range of available and needed resources and a list of 
recommendations for local healthcare systems to manage disaster induced medical surge.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I provides an overview of the research project. Chapter II discusses the 
relevant literature about disaster resources and assets, response teams, using federal and 
state government policies and guidelines, and elements related to alternate care site 
models. Chapter III outlines the methods used in the study. Chapter IV presents the data 
collected through a comparative analysis. Chapter V provides conclusions and 
recommendations related to success factors and barriers in current policies and practices 
for mitigating disaster medical surge. 
                                                 
1 Healthcare system resiliency refers to the ability of healthcare organizations to survive a hazard 
impact and rapidly recover compromised services. This ensures that a reliable platform is available to 
address medical surge needs and minimize any interruption of routine healthcare service delivery. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
We must create a firm foundation for community medical preparedness.  
We will increase our efforts to inform citizens and empower communities, 
buttress our public health infrastructure, and explore options to relieve 
current pressures on our emergency departments and emergency medical 
systems so that they retain the flexibility to prepare for and respond to 
events. (Bush 2007, HSPD 21) 
A. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
1. Introduction 
This chapter provides the background th a t  con nec t s  existing literature about 
disaster medical surge response and management to the research questions.  The literature 
in this overall filed of inquiry is diverse. The researcher limited the scope by identifying 
federal and state documents including legislation, guidance, reports, plans, and 
frameworks to support the inquiry. Included were documents that identified medical 
assets, response actions, healthcare coalitions, and the use of alternate care sites for 
medical surge management.  
A review of literature can place the existing body of knowledge into the following 
categories: 
 Federal Disaster Medical Planning and Response 
 Legislation, Guidance, and Reports 
 Medical Assets and Management 
 Federal Funding Support 
 State Disaster Medical Planning and Response  
The research proposes to examine the intersection of these various bodies of 
information to determine how to best manage state and federal resources when healthcare 
systems are overwhelmed with disaster medical surge. 
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2. Federal Disaster Medical Planning and Response 
The federal literature provides specific reference to medical surge management. 
Legislation, guidance and framework documents outline expectations for capabilities to 
meet the needs of mass casualties. The literature stops short of clearly identifying 
consequences for non-compliance of the expectations. The result is often poor patient 
outcomes that indeed would be of consequence to the healthcare system that was unable 
to acquire the resources to care for a surge of patients.  
Much of the federally-enacted guidance is assigned to a specific agency that is 
accountable to oversee the implementation. It is, however, difficult for federal agencies to 
have direct oversight of local disaster operations. Failures like in the Katrina response 
often result in a change of federal leadership at a federal agency. Craig Fugate of FEMA 
often states, “Failure is not an option.”  The concept is certainly commendable for 
FEMA; however, it does not necessarily equate to seamless coordination across all levels 
of response down to the individual that needs care following a disaster. To better 
understand federal response it is prudent to review the documents that have been 
important to the management of medical surge. 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford 
Act), PL 100-707, was signed into law November 23, 1988 and amended the Disaster 
Relief Act of 1974, PL 93-288. Since its inception, the Stafford Act gives statutory 
authority for disaster response to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 
The Stafford Act provides FEMA with the authority to coordinate disaster response on 
the federal level. FEMA’s mission is to support our citizens and first responders to ensure 
that as a nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare 
for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency 2013). 
In 2002, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
FEMA was placed under DHS. The responsibility for emergency response including the 
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) that was transferred from the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) allows for federal assets assigned to emergency 
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response to remain available to the states with a disaster declaration. Federal asset 
response was seen in disasters like Katrina, Joplin Mississippi and during the 2004 
Hurricane season in Florida. The responsibility for disaster management lies with the 
local government as FEMA assets may not be available for the first 24–48 hours of an 
incident. Coordination of federal assets with the state and local governments provides for 
a seamless transition of services and resources.  
The National Strategy for Homeland Security provides a set of guiding principles 
called the National Response Framework (NRF). Key to the NRF is the use of National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency 2003). This NIMS and ICS is important to all levels of 
government including private sector partners to ensure the same understanding of the 
mission while preparing for and responding to disasters.  
On February 28, 2003, President George W. Bush signed the Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, Management of Domestic Incidents establishes the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS). The intent of this directive is to provide 
a consistent process for Federal, State, and local governments to work cooperatively to 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or 
complexity.  
The NIMS core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covers 
the incident  command  system;  multi-agency  coordination  systems;  unified  
command; training; identification and management of resources (including systems for 
classifying types of resources); qualifications and certification; and the collections, 
tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources. HSPD 5 creates a 
single common command structure, and enables the use of a common vernacular across 
disciplines (Bush 2003 HSPD 5).  
The NIMS ICS Emergency Support Function 8 (ESF-8) is the support for health 
and medical in emergency management. ESF-8 operates on local, state and federal levels 
for coordination of health and medical resource requests and assignment of missions. 
ESF-8 working within the NIMS framework links private sector hospitals with state and 
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federal resources. Emergency managers must be prepared to manage any type of disaster 
resulting in mass casualties. Preparedness is focused on an all hazards approach.  
On December 17, 2003, HSPD 8 established national policies to strengthen the 
preparedness of the United States (Bush 2003 HSPD 8). 
The goal was to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from threatened 
or actual terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. It directed the 
Secretary DHS to develop a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal in 
coordination with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies in consultation 
with State, local, tribal, and territorial governments. HSPD 8 became part of the 
development of the National Preparedness Guidelines on September 13, 2007, which led 
to finalizing the National Preparedness Goal. The National Preparedness Guidelines 
outlines the capabilities and tasks to reach the goal of having a nation prepared for all-
hazards and identifies volunteers, citizens and communities to be a part of surge planning 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency 2007). 
As participants in the process, expectations for community preparedness to meet medical 
surge capacity and capability are outlined on the Target Capabilities List (TCL) and the 
Universal Task List (UTL). A review of the Target Capabilities List for Medical Surge 
under the Response Mission identifies three expectations that are relevant to this thesis. 
They are:  
 Plans for the set-up, staffing, and operation of alternate care facilities are 
in place 
 Plan for community based surge hospital bed surge capacity is in place 
 A 50-bed nursing subunit—per 50,000 population—can be staffed  
 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management 
Agency 2007). 
The Universal Task List (UTL) provides specific measurable tasks toward 
meeting medical surge capability. A way for communities to evaluate progress without 
having a real world disaster is to use the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation 
Program (HSEEP) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 2013), to develop and evaluate medical surge exercises and identify 
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best practices and areas for improvement. The exercise after action report allows for the 
development of an improvement plan to identify gaps in training, resources, and plans to 
ensure the ability to manage medical surge.  
Specific to sudden surge and building surge capacity, the CDC has proposed 
solutions. Hospitals should be able to triage and treat up to 300 patients in the first four 
hours of an incident by increasing staffing, making available, supplies and equipment, 
and increasing bed capacity. Personnel and caches should not be expected from federal 
assets for the first 72 hours following the disaster is specifically referenced, making 
hospitals to be self-sufficient for three days (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Disease Control and Prevention 2007).  
The CDC provides plans however does not specifically identify how to access and 
where to acquire the necessary supplies, staff and stuff for medical surge management in 
a moment’s notice. Hospitals may struggle to achieve recommendations for surge without 
outside assistance. The importance of a benchmark of treating 300 patients is that 
hospitals and public health may preplan for this type of disaster by soliciting resources 
through community partnerships. Hospitals and healthcare agencies outside the impacted 
area may provide staff, augment medical supplies and allow for patient transfers. Pre 
planning and memoranda of agreement may be an asset to communities trying to meet the 
CDC guidance.  
The Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations is an 
independent, not-for-profit organization that accredits more than 20,000 healthcare 
organizations and programs in the United States (Joint Commission for Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations 2013). There is a myriad  of  reasons  why hospitals  choose  to  
become  accredited including state requirements, financial, risk management  and  safety 
reasons and others for the performance standards that are achieved through the 
accreditation process (Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
2013). The JCAHO process is rigorous and the section for the Environment of Care 
provides performance standards for emergency preparedness utilizing AHRQ resources 
to achieve preparedness objectives. To meet the CDC guidelines, becomes problematic 
for individual hospitals especially those that are utilization driven. This means that 
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staffing is based on patient census leaving less staff to be immediately available for surge 
management. In addition, healthcare organizations have moved to a vendor-managed 
supply chain leaving less medical supplies onsite. The impact of less staff and less 
supplies causes less capability for surge management.   
The JCAHO has written and updated a white paper Health Care at the 
Crossroads: Strategies for Creating and Sustaining Community-wide Emergency 
Preparedness Systems. It identifies how hospitals and communities must work together to 
manage catastrophic events (Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations 2003).  Hospitals within large corporate networks have the ability to share 
staff and supplies within that network. The supplies and staff are moved by a request to a 
corporate office and may or may not include notification to the local emergency 
management. Although having the needed resources during a disaster is essential this in-
network support may not be part of a community-wide strategy.  
Unlike the larger hospitals or hospital systems, it is less likely that rural and non-
accredited hospitals will utilize the planning tools and resources to achieve disaster 
preparedness.  In rural communities, free-standing community hospitals, or critical access 
hospitals, have little surge capability and scant resources and are less likely to plan for 
medical surge.  Rural hospitals often refer medically-complex patients to larger hospitals 
with specialty care outside their community. This same referral process may apply to 
disasters when rural communities are faced with a disaster. It is likely that rural hospitals 
would receive assistance from neighboring communities with larger healthcare 
infrastructures (Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 2003). 
Hospital networks and rural hospitals may be less inclined to be part of building 
strategies within the community. A network hospital can access supplies through an 
internal supply chain and rural hospitals lacking supplies may refer patients outside of 
their community. 
Many hospitals and other healthcare organizations do not yet participate in fully 
functional healthcare coalitions, which are necessary to CHE response. In an attempt to 
assess the preparedness of the hospital system, HHS/ASPR commissioned The Center for 
Biosecurity of UPMC to examine various responses to catastrophic health efforts. The 
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report The Next Challenge in Healthcare Preparedness: Catastrophic Health Events 
(Center for Biosecurity of UPMC 2010), revealed the following challenges:  
 Most existing coalitions do not yet have the ability to share information, 
resources, and decision making with neighboring coalitions during a 
CHE. 
 There are inadequate systems to perform the necessary triage, immediate 
treatment, and transport of patients outside of the immediate area stricken 
by a CHE. 
 Existing plans and resources for patient transport are grossly inadequate 
for moving the expected numbers of patients. 
 There is not enough guidance on the crisis standards of care that will be 
necessary throughout all stages of a CHE. 
 There is no plan that sufficiently outlines healthcare roles, 
responsibilities, and actions during the response to a CHE. 
As the literature suggests, community-wide strategies to manage disasters are 
important and in particular for hospitals to have the necessary resources to manage 
medical surge. Healthcare stakeholders and community partners can benefit from 
working within a Disaster Healthcare Coalition. A coalition can provide an organizational 
framework to engage the whole community for the purpose of developing response plans 
and accessing shared resources. A coalition can be instrumental for bringing healthcare 
competitors together to develop plans that will allow state and Federal resources to 
integrate within the local healthcare system during a disaster. A government-centric 
approach to emergency management is not enough to meet the challenges posed by a 
catastrophic incident. Local events require the planning and participation of the entire 
community (Fugate 2011). 
Coalition members can develop mutual aid agreements that allows for resource 
reallocation and sharing, patient redistribution, and a coordinated utilization of alternate 
care sites (Courtney, Toner, Waldhorn, Franco, Rambhia, Norwood, Inglesby, and 
O’Toole 2009). The literature frequently use the terms, mutual aid, coordination, 
collaboration, communication and coalition, and indicates a need to work together 
interdisciplinary and across geographical boundaries. At the state and local levels, federal 
resources are available to deploy and augment response operations under a disaster 
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declaration and through a request to emergency management. Requests for resources are 
made for staff or medical teams, medical equipment and supplies, pharmaceuticals and 
for infrastructure to support patient care. The hierarchy of requests from local to state to 
federal ensures that each level will expend the available resources prior to moving the 
request to the next level. This model for requests ensures that resources closest to the 
incident are used first before those further away are deployed. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Hierarchy of Requests (From California Department of Public Health 
Standards and Guidelines for Healthcare Surge during Emergencies Hospital 
Training Presentation 2008) 
3. Medical Assets and Management 
Local and regional healthcare systems have a range of federal medical assets that 
may be available to them. The literature identifies assets that if well-coordinated with 
local hospitals and community organizations, could augment and support medical surge 
effectively. The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), for instance, provides 
medical services collaboratively with U.S. Public Health Service, the Department of 
Defense (DOD), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Health and 
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Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 2013). 
The NDMS mission provides medical response, patient evacuation and definitive 
medical care. The NDMS definitive medical care system concentrates on major 
metropolitan areas with airports and landing zones to coordinate a nationwide medical 
mutual aid network utilizing public and private sector assets. The concept was 
developed from the Civilian Military Contingency Hospital System (CMCHS), which in 
1980 was established by the DOD. The idea was to augment military medical capacity 
and capability without enlarging the hospital system. Instead, the CMCHS solicited the 
cooperation of civilian hospitals, 100 beds or more to meet the nation's medical 
requirements during a short-term conventional war or nationally declared emergencies. 
The Federal Coordinating Center (FCC) coordinates bed availability with the 
Armed Services Medical Regulating Office (ASMRO) of NDMS. To prevent a patient 
from becoming lost in the transfer process, the Federal Coordinating Center (FCC) tracks 
and distributes disaster patients to healthcare facilities for appropriate treatment, outside 
the impacted area (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and Response 2012). Patient evacuation under the Department of 
Defense (DOD) relies on the aero medical resources of the U.S. Air Force and the Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The NDMS profile includes 72 Coordinating Centers over 
107 geographic areas, and approximately 2,000 hospitals committing 110,605 beds.  
The U.S. Army National Guard is another federal asset that can transfer patients 
from one location to another. This asset has several components to assist with patient 
movement during medical surge, to decompress a hospital or for evacuation. Air and 
ground transport assets may include medics and medical teams however much of the 
National Guard medical personnel is in reserve status meaning there may be a delay for 
activation. The National Guard has caches of medical supplies that can be deployed to 
augment community needs. To deploy these assets requires a request through emergency 
management and will take 24–48 hours to mobilize and some assets will then require 
assembly.  
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A federal asset to support the integration of emergency management, health, and 
medical systems in 124 jurisdictions, with guidance from the Department of Health and 
Human Services, is the National MMRS Program, located  in the Office of Health 
Affairs under DHS. The MMRS assists with sustainment and enhancement of regionally 
integrated mass casualty preparedness and response and assists with all hazards planning, 
training and response for mass casualty incidents. Primarily designed for densely 
populated jurisdictions, the MMRS provides capacity and capability to improve disaster 
survivor outcomes. The MMRS can acquire pharmaceuticals and personal protective 
equipment (PPE) needed for WMD incidents. An MMRS response is a 24-hour period 
that augments the existing local operational response system (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security 2011). 
One federal asset, that brings medical supplies and personnel to augment or 
supplant a healthcare facility that has been destroyed, is the Disaster Medical Assistance 
Team (DMAT). In Joplin, Mississippi, DMAT teams were able to restore medical 
services to the community in the parking lot when the hospital was completely destroyed 
by a tornado.  DMAT teams are self-sufficient and can mobilize with supplies to support 
medical operations for 14 days with 35 member teams (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response 2011) . 
A federal organization that provides support to local units of volunteers to 
strengthen public health, emergency response and community, is the Medical Reserve 
Corp (MRC). Credentialed volunteers may provide service within their local 
jurisdiction, in their home state, or may volunteer to be activated nationally. 
During a disaster or public health emergency, volunteers accepting a mission are 
provided with travel orders, mission assignments, and receive information directly 
related to the deployment. The Secretary of HHS may appoint the MRC volunteers as 
Intermittent Disaster Response Personnel, to grant legal protections when working within 
the scope of Federal employment including liability protection, workers’ compensation 
and employment protection. Federal response to large-scale national emergencies can 
allow for the MRC to integrate with DMAT (U.S. Office of the Surgeon General 
2013). 
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“Uniting communities, preparing the nation” is the motto of the Citizen Corps 
Program (CCP), which brings together citizens and community leaders to plan and 
coordinate emergency preparedness. The CCP engages participants with training, 
exercises, and volunteer opportunities to build awareness for how to prevent, 
protect/mitigate, prepare for, and respond to disasters. CCP includes all 50 states, the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 2013). 
A disaster response of the magnitude requiring extended medical management can 
include a Federal Medical Station (FMS) (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 2007, 7-20). The FMS is an HHS asset of the CDC, Division of Strategic 
National Stockpile (DSNS).
 
This deployable healthcare platform delivers large-scale 
primary healthcare services within 48–96 hours from the time of request to delivery 
inside the continental U.S. and requires a 12-hour assembly time. 
A staff of approximately 100 can treat 250 people for up to three days.  The FMS 
contains beds and medical and pharmaceutical resources. Outside of the main mission, to 
mass vaccinate or supply antidotes from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), an FMS 
can provide pre-hospital triage and initial stabilization of mass casualty patients. Unlike 
DMAT teams that arrive with shelters, the FMS requires a 40,000 square foot structurally 
intact building with utilities and amenities. There must be available food service or a 
contract, laundry, ice, medical oxygen filling, and biomedical waste disposal. An 
additional service of the FMS is community outreach provided by a rapidly deployable 
light strike team-based platform. The strike team deploys with basic medical and 
pharmaceutical resources in Go Bags to sustain 50 to 100 stable primary care-based 
ambulatory patients. 
4. Federal Funding 
There has been an incredible amount of money spent on disaster preparedness in 
an effort to prepare for, respond to, and recover from all-hazards, natural and man-made, 
including terrorism. One estimate is that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has 
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spent $791 billion since 2002. During that same time, the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services has awarded more than $916 million to 50 states, 8 territories and freely 
associated states, and 4 municipalities; Chicago, Los Angeles New York City, and 
Washington, D.C., for the purpose of improving preparedness and health outcomes for 
a wide range of public health threats (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 2011). 
Critics of the spending point to disorganization and a lack of coordination 
among agencies, between levels, federal, state, local, and with seamless 
articulation of resources to local communities. In fiscal year 2011, MMRS was 
allocated $34,929,932, the Citizen Corps Program (CCP) was allocated $9,980,000 (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security 2011), and more than $613 million was awarded 
through the Public Health Emergency Response (PHER) grant program and $352 million 
through the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response program (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 2011). 
In the context of medical surge management, there was a significant 
amount of equipment and supplies purchased, training, and exercising has 
occurred, and many good intentions toward becoming a prepared community have 
taken place.  However, there is less evidence for the consistency of preparedness 
across jurisdictional lines and across disciplines.  Although the funding has been 
necessary to support preparedness, it becomes less about the money and more 
about the continuum of care for the survivors of a catastrophic disaster where 
medical surge exceeds available resources.  
5. State Disaster Medical Planning and Response  
In June 2008, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) presented a 
report based on a literature review of state emergency preparedness documents and 
interviews with twenty state emergency preparedness officials. The report identifies four 
key components related to preparing for medical surge in a mass casualty event: (1) 
increasing hospital capacity, including beds, workforce, equipment, and supplies; (2) 
identifying and operating alternate care sites when hospital capacity is overwhelmed; (3) 
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registering and credentialing volunteer medical professionals; and (4) planning for 
appropriate altered standards of care in order to save the most lives in a mass casualty 
event (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2008). 
The GAO examined these investments and found  that  efforts  toward  increasing  
hospital  capacity,  identifying alternate care sites, and registering medical volunteers was 
successful with more than half of the 50 states having met or were close to meeting the 
criteria for the five medical-surge- related sentinel indicators for hospital capacity (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 2010). The 2008 report specifically identified 
alternate care sites as a method to increase hospital capacity and deliver medical care 
away from the hospital for patients who would normally be treated as inpatients. The 
report suggests patients should be able to sort and determine who needs critical attention 
and immediate hospital transport, from those with less serious injuries and can wait for 
medical intervention.  
There are two types of alternate care sites—fixed and mobile. Fixed facilities are 
nonmedical buildings that, because of their size or proximity to a hospital, can be adapted 
to make non clinical space into a facility to provide medical care. This option for 
available space is especially important in the first few hours following a disaster when 
disaster survivors are seeking care. Mobile medical facilities can range from a tent to 
specialized units with surgical and intensive care capabilities based on tractor-trailer 
platforms. There a hybrid of the two containing a fully equipped hospital stored in a 
container system that can be mobilized and set up to treat patients.  
A model for building alternate care sites is the Rocky Mountain Regional Care 
Model for Bioterrorism, developed by a working group representing seven states and 
federal partners. Although at the time of this research the model is archived, it is still 
useful and has been adopted in full or in part by states because of its consistent and 
coordinated response model for developing alternate care sites. The purpose for the group 
coming together, was as a result of the federal suggestion that a benchmark to provide 
500 hospital beds per million population during surge was unachievable for many 
healthcare systems. Through a collaborative planning process in Federal Region VIII, 
surge capacity tools and products were developed to manage disaster medical surge away 
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from the already overwhelmed existing healthcare system (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2004). The workgroup 
suggested that medical caches be stored for use in a fixed location or have the ability to 
be transported in a trailer to an alternate care site. Three cache levels were developed: 
 Level I, Hospital Augmentation Cache ($20,000) 
 Level II, Regional Alternative Care Site Cache ($100,000)  
 Level III, Comprehensive Alternative Care Site List 
Pharmaceuticals are not included in the caches, but are available through the 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Deployable oxygen solutions were discussed as 
a separate issue and tabled in discussion due to the complexity and cost of oxygen 
storage.  Each cache list does not include a facility though cots and other supplies are 
available to move into a designated hospital or any alternate care site.  States may choose 
to pre-designate physical space to host an ACS and the Alternative Medical Care 
Selection Matrix provides a model for choosing an appropriate site. 
Another way states have planned is through an agreement with the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact. EMAC is a national interstate mutual aid compact 
which allows states to share resources during a disaster. EMAC is administered by the 
National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) and was ratified by Congress 
and law in all 50 states and some U.S. territories. The EMAC provides medical 
assistance, supplies, equipment, and personnel as a complement to the federal disaster 
response system when requested through emergency management. There are fifteen 
states that are developing Mission Ready Packages that are a way to asset type resources 
for response and recovery. MRPs related to the topic of disaster medical care are for 
emergency medical transport, acute surgical and trauma care and emergency and critical 
care. There are other MRPs for mass care, search, and rescue (National Emergency 
Management Association Emergency Medical Assistance Compact 2012). 
EMAC used either in lieu of or in conjunction with federal assistance, provides 
for a flow of needed goods and services from one state or states to support resource 
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needs of the disaster impacted state. EMAC provides another venue for mitigating 
resource deficiencies by ensuring maximum use of all available resources within its 
member states inventories.  
There are many variables when caring for patients during a disaster, especially 
when the disaster has the potential to overwhelm a healthcare system or community. 
Relevant to medical surge is having the resources where needed to support an increased 
number of patients arriving to the hospital simultaneously. A review of the literature 
shows most states have resources to respond to disasters specifically for the management 
of medical surge. Florida and California became smart examples by having robust plans 
and frameworks for preparedness and response, and by having fixed and mobile medical 
assets. These states have responded to natural disasters and have made an effort to meet 
federal priorities and NIMS compliance. To support the notion of rapid response, there 
are identified and dedicated assets like medical assistance teams, medical volunteers, 
alternate care sites, pharmaceuticals, and equipment and supply caches that can become 
available by request or by pre-existing automatic aid agreements to a disaster impacted 
area.   
On the West coast of the U.S., California is the third-largest state geographically, 
and has a population of 38.04 million in 58 counties. In 2010, California was the number 
one travel destination in the U.S. There are over 40 U.S. military bases and installations, 
with over 212,000 military personnel. Wildfires, hurricanes, and earthquakes have been 
some of the natural disasters experienced by California.  
In California, disaster management plans link local, state, and federal resources 
together to efficiently move patients from an incident scene through medical care and 
repatriation. The plan is reflective of the commitment of California to rapidly provide 
assets to augment local response and provide sustained support for disaster medical 
operations (California Emergency Medical Services Authority 2007).  
On the East coast of the U.S., Florida has 67 counties, 19 million residents, and 
87.3 million annual visitors. Florida has a strong military presence at over twenty bases 
and stations, and is host to the United States Central Command, and the United States 
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Southern Command. Federal assets are staged in Florida including pharmaceutical 
antidotes and the more metropolitan areas of Florida have MMRS, response teams, 
trauma centers and caches of medical supplies and equipment. Florida has experienced, 
and responded to, disasters like hurricanes, flooding, and wildfires.  
Florida utilizes the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, with the 
ESF-8 appendix, to identify responsibilities for health and medical response with the 
State Emergency Response Team (Florida Division of Emergency Management 2012). 
The FDOH Emergency Operations Plan provides the framework for response and 
recovery from disasters (Florida Department of Health 2011).  
States like Florida and California have embedded federal resources like DMAT, 
the MRC, Citizen Corp, and MMRS. In addition, there are state assets like medical 
response teams and mobile field hospitals purchased with federal funding. The state 
coordination of resources can pre-position or enact MOUs that can lessen the disaster 
response time. Federal response, unless the assets are in the state, take time to deploy 
once a Presidential Declaration is executed. Consideration for the time it takes for 
responders to accept the mission, travel, and arrive at the requestor’s location, leaves 
states having to fill the gaps between local needs and federal intervention. A disaster 
that impacts roads, airports, or is of the magnitude to destroy infrastructure, causes an 
increased delay in response. States and local jurisdictions may be responsible for 
managing medical surge for several days following a disaster. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The literature shows a commitment for preparing for catastrophic disasters by 
staging federal and state resources to rapidly respond to and support local communities. 
The importance of integrated medical disaster response in the U.S. is essential so as not 
to lose precious time with accessing and deploying resources to treat disaster survivors. 
Coordination of resources is accomplished by states and federal mechanisms; 
unfortunately, there is little that can be done to ensure that every community has an 
unlimited amount of medical resources when needed. Funding for preparedness has been 
robust; however, as time has passed, the funding has been declining. As healthcare 
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organizations, communities and states struggle to sustain the training, exercises and 
equipment maintenance and supply restock, strategies to manage medical surge must be 
enhanced. The need to do the best with less will be the prevailing message.  
The various federal guidelines, reports, policies and models identify commitment 
toward providing care when surge impacts a community and shows how assets can move 
from the state and federal government to augment or supplant overwhelmed healthcare 
infrastructure. Although there are resources available to deploy from state and federal 
levels, the responsibility for managing surge within the first hours to days is placed onto 
the local community and healthcare facilities. Two states, California and Florida, show 
promise by their commitment for having a response system and medical assets available 
to manage medical surge during disasters. The federal, state, and local levels are making 
strides to provide the right stuff at the right place at the right time to effectively and 
efficiently to provide care that will be the best care for the most patients. 
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The goal of this thesis is to identify models, frameworks and medical assets and 
resources that can lessen the impact of medical surge upon a community during a 
disaster.  At a moment’s notice, local resources can be rapidly depleted as the healthcare 
system becomes overwhelmed when caring for multiple casualties. The need to manage 
scarce resources, access available resources, and deliver medical care, becomes the 
responsibility of the whole community not just the impacted hospital or medical facility.  
An understanding of the strategies for how federal and state assets can augment local 
community disaster response can provide a model of smart practices for the 
management of medical surge.  
B. LITERATURE 
The literature used in this thesis includes federal publications and reports, journal 
articles, operational plans, guidance, and framework documents, and was obtained from 
Internet searches, federal and state documents, and library holdings, including books and 
journal articles. Twelve state models were assessed for available guidance and resources 
for medical surge management.  
C. EVALUATION OF THE LITERATURE 
The evaluation of the literature was a two-phase process. Phase one was to gather 
federal and state literature related to management of medical surge and review for 
definitions, policies, recommendations and strategies. Phase two took the plans, strategies 
and policies from States that had sufficient literature to identify assets useful for medical 
surge management. The researcher chose California and Florida. A future researcher may 
consider a comparative analysis of other states not included in this research.  
The literature was sorted and compiled into two categories. 
 Federal 
 State (California, Florida) 
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The sample could conceivably include all 50 states and U.S. territories, which 
would be difficult to analyze for this purpose.  After review of the existing literature, the 
researcher chose to manage the sample size by choosing two states for the comparative 
analysis. The states of California and Florida were chosen for the following reasons:  
 Large healthcare networks exist. 
 Disasters have impacted and have been managed in the state. 
 State level resources and plans, frameworks and strategies are robust. 
 Federal resources are co-located in the state. 
 The states are located on different coasts of the U.S. 
Federal assets were chosen based upon the literature for their availability and the 
capability to either directly respond to or indirectly coordinate the management of 
disaster medical surge.  The Federal resources with medical responsibilities identified 
are: 
 Disaster Medical Assistance Team  
 Metropolitan Medical Response System  
 Federal Medical Stations 
 Medical Reserve Corp 
 Army National Guard 
 Federal Coordinating Centers 
 Community Emergency Response Team and Citizen Corp Program 
D. METHOD 
This thesis will use a comparative analysis with the goal of identifying available 
resources in California, Florida, and at the federal level for the management of medical 
surge. Once the resources are identified, they will then be analyzed for their effectiveness 




The comparative analysis process will be instrumental for developing 
recommendations for resources that may best integrate with local healthcare 
infrastructures. The analysis will attempt to clarify available resources and how best to 
integrate those resources in a timely manner when significant medical resources and 
interventions are needed at the local level.  
The researcher will identify resources that individually or collectively can manage 
surge in an effective and efficient manner. Once the resources are accessed, they will be 
compiled for preparing recommendations and drawing conclusions for managing medical 
surge. 
The following resources for managing disaster medical surge will be evaluated 
and compared to identify the best utilization.  
 The source or level from where the resource will deploy from, federal, 
state, military or local. 
 Response Time—the time it takes for the asset to ready, deploy and 
accept the first disaster survivor. 
 Cache—(Stuff) the equipment and supplies available  
  Staffing-(Staff) the number of people or medical professionals available 
to deploy  
  Mission Served— describes how the asset will or can be utilized  
 Special Considerations—to identify anything that is required for the 
asset to be used  
 Fixed or Deployable—(Space) those assets which can move or may be 
used at a predetermined site to add capacity to the existing healthcare 
system. 
 Number Available—identifies how many are available to be used to 
mitigate disaster medical surge in totality. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Homeland Security will consolidate federal response 
plans and build a national system for incident management in cooperation 
with state and local government. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
Office of Homeland Security 2002) 
The FEMA Administrator, Craig Fugate provided testimony before the U.S. 
House of Representatives.    
An incident of catastrophic proportions has the potential to imperil 
thousands of people, devastate hundreds of communities, and produce far- 
reaching economic and social effects.  The scope of needs will be large, 
immediate, novel, and profound, and the entire national emergency 
management, public health, security, law enforcement, critical 
infrastructure, medical, and all other components that make up community 
must be prepared to respond, and respond in ways that lie outside the 
normal paradigms in which we traditionally operate. (Fugate 2009) 
Nearly 5,000 emergency departments (EDs) exist in the United States and provide 
care for patients with emergency medical conditions 24 hours a day, and 365 days a 
year (Derlet and Richards 2002). Annually, visits to the EDs have increased from 
90.3 million in 1993 to 113.9 million in 2003 (Institute of Medicine Committee 
2006). In 2002, a representative survey commissioned by the American Hospital 
Association, showed that many EDs are overwhelmed by the number of patients 
needing their services, with 62 percent of the nation’s EDs reporting being “at” or “over” 
operating capacity (American Hospital Association 2002). 
Disasters causing multiple casualties are frequent. The injured seek medical care 
from hospitals and healthcare facilities in close proximity to the disaster. Those less 
injured often self-evacuate the scene and arrive at the hospital before EMS completes 
triage and packages the injured patients for transport. The self-evacuees at the 
hospital create a bottleneck for space and an increased demand for scarce resources that 
would best serve the more critically injured. Once EMS with the more severely injured 
arrives, there is less space and fewer resources. The impact of a disaster can be 
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overwhelming to a healthcare system already challenged for resources on a daily basis. 
The Centers for Disease Control has developed a predictor based on time for arriving 
casualties to the emergency department following a disaster. 
 
Figure 2.  CDC Mass Casualty Predictor (From Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Emergency Preparedness and Response 2003) 
The total number of casualties that will present to the hospital from a disaster can 
be calculated by doubling the number arriving in the first hour (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Emergency Preparedness and Response 2003). The advantage 




resources or initiate MOUs to transfer patients or request resources. The average time 
for patients to be admitted or discharged following a disaster is about six hours from 
arrival. This time indicates an extended impact on the facility. 
Retrospective review of previous disasters has shaped plans, legislation, 
guidelines, and collaborative agreements on the federal, state, and local levels. The need 
to increase capacity and capability of healthcare infrastructure and services may be 
mitigated by community coordination, which will provide timely deployment by pooling 
of resources. Having the resources when and where they are needed in the right amount at 
the right time can make the difference between life and death for disaster survivors. 
Recommendations from the report The Next Challenge in Healthcare Preparedness: 
Catastrophic Health Events, identifies the funding and preparedness efforts that need to 
be in place at the federal, state, and community levels (Center for Biosecurity UPMC 
2010). 
B. FEDERAL GUIDANCE AND RESPONSE 
Through the Departments of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, the 
federal government, and the Centers for Disease Control, and the White House has 
developed guidance for managing medical surge. This guidance includes National 
Strategies, Presidential Directives, Acts, guidelines, frameworks, and task lists. In 2002, 
when Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), emergency 
response, including the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), was placed under the 
Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA). The Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) establishes structure and 
coordination for  a declared emergency to deliver assistance and emphasizes the use of 
state and local resources first (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2013).  
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Figure 3.  Overview of Stafford Act Support to the States (From U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency 2008) 
Under the Stafford Act, an emergency presidential declaration will make federal 
assistance available by the request of the Governor of the impacted state.  Federal assets 
are intended to support, not supplant, state, tribal, and jurisdictional response efforts. The 
National Response Framework provides a systematic process for requesting assistance. 
In an attempt to ensure that ESF-8 at local, state and federal levels work together, 
the Public Health and Medical appendix to the National Response Framework identifies 
how Federal departments will ensure a timely response once a Presidential declaration is 
activated. Federal departments, agencies and organizations assigned primary or 
supporting ESF responsibilities implement those responsibilities. Incident-specific 
resources and capabilities, teams, medical equipment and supplies, shelters and 
pharmaceutical caches are activated and prepared for deployment to a National Logistical 
Staging Area (LSA) near the incident site. The LSA prioritizes and moves resources to 
where they will be best utilized to establish alternate care sites or to augment or replace 
healthcare infrastructure or to where the resources will best be utilized. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directives provide federal agencies with direction 
to support states. HSPD 5, established the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), a consistent interoperable and compatible nationwide system for federal, state, 
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and local governments for effective and efficient integration to prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity (Bush 
HSPD 5 2003).  
A command system similar to NIMS is the Hospital Incident Command System 
(HICS). Both command systems allow for coordination across organizations and 
jurisdictions (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management 
Agency 2008). HICS allows hospitals to manage surge events internally or externally and 
provides a process for initiating command and control with language familiar to 
healthcare personnel (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 2008).  
HSPD 8 in 2007 became part of the development of the National Preparedness 
Guidelines which led to finalizing the National Preparedness Goal. The National 
Preparedness Guidelines outline capabilities and tasks to reach the goal of having a 
nation prepared for all-hazards. It identifies volunteers, citizens, and communities to be 
part of surge planning (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 2007). Expectations for community preparedness to meet medical 
surge capacity and capability are outlined on the Target Capabilities List (TCL) and the 
Universal Task List (UTL). Under the Response Mission, the Target Capabilities List for 
Medical Surge identifies three expectations that are relevant to this thesis. They are:  
 Plans for the set-up, staffing, and operation of alternate care facilities are 
in place 
 Plan for community based surge hospital bed surge capacity is in place 
 A 50-bed nursing subunit—per 50,000 population—can be staffed (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management 
Agency 2007). 
Like DHS, HHS has a Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS) for a unified 
approach to all mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery activities (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response 2013). 
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The coordination of Federal-level assets, for Bioterrorism and Mass Casualty 
Care, to support and augment state and local medical and public health response is 
outlined in HSPD-10. For mass casualty incidents requiring parallel deployment of 
multiple agencies, the Department of Homeland Security coordinates the overall Federal 
response in accordance with its statutory authorities for domestic incident management 
(Bush HSPD 10 2004).  
Two sections of HSPD 21, October 2007, that are specific to this research—Mass 
Casualty Care and Disaster Health System—engage all levels of government, 
jurisdictions, and disciplines, private sector, academia, and other nongovernmental 
entities in preparedness and response efforts (Bush HSPD 21 2007). The use of the DHS 
and HHS documents are intended to identify levels of all hazards preparedness. 
Coordination however, is left to individual states and local healthcare infrastructures to 
ensure adequate levels of preparedness to make a difference for all hazards.  
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), provides medical 
assistance, supplies, equipment, and personnel, and ensures the maximum use of all 
available resources within its member states inventories (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security Federal Emergency Management Agency EMAC N.D). The EMAC 
administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) was ratified 
by Congress in 1996. An annex to the EMAC is the interstate mutual aid compact based 
on FEMA regions with the goal of receiving interstate assistance within twelve hours of 
request (U.S. House of Representatives 2007). The EMAC and IMAC is an important 
part of moving resources into the impacted area from neighboring states.  
The National Disaster Management System (NDMS) has provided medical 
support since 1984 to federal, state, local, and private healthcare partners during disasters. 
NDMS support includes mobilizing DMAT teams, FCCs and MMRS. Through the 
Federal Coordinating Center (FCC), disaster survivors are distributed to hospitals and 
healthcare facilities away from the impacted community. The concept was developed 
from the 1980 DOD Civilian Military Contingency Hospital System (CMCHS) model. 
The idea was to augment military medical capacity and capabilities without having to 
enlarge the hospital system. Instead, the CMCHS solicited the cooperation of civilian 
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hospitals to meet the nation's medical surge requirements during a short-term 
conventional war or during a nationally declared emergency. Hospitals with at least 100 
beds and are willing to accept disaster patients enter into an agreement with NDMS. 
These agreements allow for reimbursement to the hospitals for participation.  
The Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) is a national program in the 
Office of Health Affairs under DHS. The MMRS supports the integration of emergency 
management, health, and medical systems in 124 jurisdictions with guidance from the 
Department of Health and Human Services. The MMRS assists stakeholders within a 
region to integrate mass casualty preparedness and response plans and mass casualty 
incident response.  The difference between NDMS and MMRS is that NDMS provides 
DMAT teams, transportation, and definitive medical care and MMRS provides 
coordination of medical resources in metropolitan areas like Tampa and Miami in 
Florida, and five cities in California.  
The ten national disaster planning regions use Regional Emergency Coordinators 
(REC) to develop high level emergency preparedness plans and to coordinate response 
activities (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response 2011). The role of the REC is to build relationships to plan 
with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials, and healthcare partners and 
stakeholders for effective federal emergency response activities. This is accomplished by 
cross-discipline integration among public health, medical, and emergency management 
partners; providing situational awareness to headquarters; responding to events and 
providing command and control for deployed resources and assets; and providing 
exercise support to stakeholders (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response 2013). When a disaster occurs, the 
REC will lead the Incident Response Coordination Team comprised of the NDMS 
members and Federal public health staff, who act as the first responders to the incident.  
Through a presidential declaration, resources like DMAT and MRC units and 
caches of equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals are pre-positioned across the U.S. 
(Redlener, Grant, Berman, Johnson, and Abramson 2006). Federal planning has focused 
on timely coordination of resources to reach the level of preparedness that can manage 
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disaster medical surge. Often times, coordination of resources for medical surge in the 
first hours is left to the state and the local healthcare infrastructure. The Institute of 
Medicine concludes that Emergency Departments are not prepared to handle surge from 
terrorist attacks and other incidents (Institute of Medicine Committee 2006). The reliance 
on federal resources to manage medical surge is short sighted and coordination among 
local stakeholders is essential for saving lives. The development of site-specific 
catastrophic incident response strategies includes pre-identifying resource requirements 
and corresponding deployment strategies to accelerate the timely provision of critical 
capabilities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management 
Agency 2008). Healthcare facilities, including VA hospitals, must prioritize resources 
and consider postponing elective surgeries and redirecting staff to manage medical surge 
during disasters.  
1. Response Teams 
Federal funding supports DMAT and MRC, and states have used these models to 
develop State Medical Response Teams. The state teams are a resource for rapid 
deployment when there is no emergency declaration. These state or regional teams can 
fill the role of providing medical care when local assets are overwhelmed. State Medical 
Response teams modeled after DMATs provide local and regional response to impacted 
healthcare facilities and can integrate with MRC and DMAT teams should the disaster 
persist. Local healthcare communities can collectively develop a self-sufficiency plan 
including the development medical response teams to assist in the management of 
medical surge. 
DMAT and MRC have credentialed medical personnel that are trained, 
background checked and equipped to mobilize to support local staffing shortages and 
provide backfill for staff who may be directly impacted by a disaster. The teams respond 
to a mission request under a disaster declaration and are provided sovereign immunity 
protections and job protection when deployed. 
DMAT teams are typed according to capability and time to deploy. A Type I 
DMAT activated for two weeks, can be fully deployable within eight hours of 
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notification and is self-sufficient for 72 hours. These teams are equipped to treat up to 
250 patients per day. Level II teams are not required to be self-sufficient and may be 
deployed to augment local resources or supplement a Level I DMAT team.  
A deployable US Air Force military asset to support civilian disasters is the small 
portable expeditionary aero medical rapid response (SPEARR) team with eight medical 
personnel with medical supply backpacks. The team becomes complete with the addition 
of a trailer with a shelter, equipment, and supplies. (Skelton, Droege, and Carlisle 2003) 
2. Surge Space 
Hospitals have leveraged federal funding to increase clinical surge space by 
utilizing non-clinical space like cafeterias, training rooms, or tents and shelters. The 
benchmark for surge is to increase capacity by twenty percent of the licensed bed count. 
The action of moving and redirecting non critical patients away from the emergency 
department leaves space for the more severely injured. Some communities have explored 
the use of “facilities of opportunity” including the use of dark stores, concert venues and 
schools and medical facilities designed for another purpose (Joint Commission for 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 2005).  A surge option is to establish 
agreements with federal medical facilities like the Veterans Administration (VA) that has 
1,384 medical facilities—90 percent of which are clinics or hospitals—located 
throughout the U.S. The connectivity of communities with the VA federal assets can 
improve the level of planning and response and provides additional surge resources. 
When medical surge is sustained or when a facility is destroyed, assets are needed 
to provide health services through to the recovery phase of the disaster. Most states with 
mobile assets have strategically stored those assets across the State for a  quick 
response within a few hours. Using canopies, tents, and modular systems, provide an 
option for surge space; however, some states have purchased more complex systems. 
States including CA and FL have purchased tractor trailer based 53-foot mobile hospitals 
that can care for up to fifty patients simultaneously.  
Another surge option is the EMEDS, a flexible lightweight, rapidly deployable 
medical-delivery system. The basic EMEDS package has supplies and equipment is used 
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by fifteen personnel in two shelters. The EMEDS 10 package contains 31 persons, 3 more 
shelters, and 10 inpatient beds. EMEDS 25 package contains 30 persons, 3 more shelters, 
and 15 inpatient beds. The EMEDS capability can continue to expand with additional ten-
bed packages or specialty sets.  
The USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) and the USNS Comfort (T-AH20) are two naval 
hospital ships for use in civilian missions, when significant devastation is long lasting or 
the healthcare infrastructure is destroyed as in Hurricane Katrina. These ships can be 
staffed with 1,200 naval medical personnel and contain 12 fully-equipped operating 
rooms, a 1,000-bed hospital facility, digital radiological services, a medical laboratory, a 
pharmacy, an optometry lab, a CT-scan, and two oxygen-producing plants. Each ship is 
equipped with a helicopter deck capable of landing large military helicopters and has side 
ports to take on patients at sea. The ships are docked in Baltimore, Maryland, and San 
Diego, California, and with crew, can be activated within five days.  This asset may be a 
planning consideration in California and Florida because of the coastlines and access to 
ports.  
Some alternate care site models have been referred to as Mobile Army Surgical 
Hospital (MASH) units.  A civilian version of the mobile tent hospital, it can provide care 
to patients of less severity and is usually much smaller in size. The military can act with 
precision to treat, transport and deliver extended care to soldiers which can be mimicked 
for civilian disasters. The logistical planning for deployment includes teams, mobile 
hospitals, and caches of equipment ready to deploy at a moment’s notice 
3. Equipment and Supplies 
Medical caches of c o n t a i n e r i z ed  pharmaceuticals, equipment and supplies, 
and shelters for surge can be deployed with or without specialty teams. The availability 
and access to these caches is an important aspect for achieving increased capability. Most 
are stored in large warehouses where logistics personnel assure the readiness for 
deployment. Caches under federal and some state control are pre-positioned in 
geographic locations to facilitate rapid deployment. The types of equipment and supplies 
matched with medical response teams can maximize positive patient outcomes.  
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Cache storage at the local level may take advantage of partnerships within the 
healthcare system in facilities that have space. A consideration may be for local 
communities to enter into agreements with a vendor management system or rental 
company to make shelters available when needed thus alleviating local storage space for 
these larger items.  
Mobilization of caches requires trucks, trailers, pallets and in some cases planes to 
move these items into a disaster impacted community. The storage of supplies, in a 
climate controlled environment to prevent degradation, is costly. A plan to rotate medical 
supplies within the healthcare system will minimize the disposal of expired supplies. A 
vendor managed supply system contract is an option to keep supplies rotated.  
Maintenance and calibration of medical equipment is also costly. Similarly, maintenance 
contracts with a vendor or an agreement with a biomedical provider may be an option. 
Funding for sustainment of equipment and supplies becomes the responsibility of the 
cache manager and must be considered when committing to a cache. 
C. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM SUPPORT 
Triage is the process of sorting patients according to severity of injury. As 
patients are sorted the less injured may be treated and stabilized at the lowest possible 
level.  Expansion of a healthcare infrastructure can be accomplished by having a contract 
to utilize the available resources in the most efficient and effective manner if community 
healthcare partners collaborate and plan together to route patients to the most appropriate 
facility for care. This practice would move surge from the closest impacted hospital to 
another less impacted hospital or alternate care site therefore distributing patients more 
equally throughout the healthcare system.  
Developing a community-wide coordinated disaster response system is a 
challenge though some local jurisdictions have worked together to develop plans for 
disaster medical surge management.  The lack of local coordination makes integration 
with state and federal resources difficult during disasters. An unplanned response is 
often reactive not proactive and risks the opportunity to fully utilize all available 
resources. Significant collaboration, communication, and trust are necessary to fully 
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coordinate a plan to utilize all community resources. Hospitals have worked together in 
non-disaster times to develop agreements for patient transfers. As patients are transferred 
there may be staff that moves with them. Credentialing of staff to work inter-facility may 
be a piece of these agreements.  
The Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response funding has provided 
preparedness funding to hospitals to purchase equipment, train staff and conduct 
exercises. Part of the grant guidance to build community resiliency identifies hospitals 
and public health working together to provide outreach to other healthcare organizations 
and first responders to develop disaster healthcare coalitions. This model of building 
strong community relationships while preparing for the worst enables communities to 
measure capacity and capability and know what to expect before requesting support from 
state or federal agencies. California and Florida have areas within the states that have 
strong disaster healthcare coalition involvement and supporting agreements to share 
resources. 
D. STATE PLANNING AND RESPONSE 
1. California Plans 
California has an Emergency Operations Manual developed cooperatively by 
CDPH, EMSA and CalEMA and coordinates medical and health resources to provide 
response support. Prior to 2011, EOMs gave the authority and direction for resource 
deployment to the six regions the OA and the individual entities to best meet disaster 
needs. The change moves the focus from individual entities to collective resource and 
response support (California Department of Public Health and Emergency Medical 
Services Authority 2011).  
California coordinates disaster response at the local level by using designated 
Operational Areas (OA). In each OA, geographical and political area, there is an 
appointed Operational Area Disaster Medical and Health Coordinator (OADMHC) 
responsible for health and medical response. There are six mutual-aid regions with a 
Regional Disaster Medical and Health Coordinator (RDMHC) to support resource 
requests from the OADMHC. This coordination allows information to be shared and 
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resources to be moved from unaffected areas into the impacted area. In addition, medical 
personnel and teams and medical vendors and private partnerships can be used to obtain 
the necessary resources (California Department of Public Health and Emergency Medical 
Services Authority 2011). 
Specific to sharing resources is the Master Mutual Aid Agreement (MMAA). The 
entities that sign the MMAA agreement become obligated to develop a plan that provides 
aid and includes mobilization of resources without the expectation for reimbursement. 
The advantage is that the agreement becomes reciprocal should an entity need disaster 
assistance.  There is however no expectation for any entity to provide mutual aid that will 
completely deplete facility resources or space. California has emergency assistance 
agreements in addition to the MMAA. The emergency assistance agreements promote 
public and private collaboration for resources. These agreements can be less formal and 
allow for customization for providing specific resources or services between agencies and 
organizations (California Department of Public Health and Emergency Medical Services 
Authority 2011). 
A five-level color system defines criteria for surge as green indicating no surge on 
the local healthcare system, and is fully operational to black. Local jurisdiction is not 
capable of meeting the demand and requires a local state of emergency declaration. 
Beyond the local criteria, there is a regional surge level requiring a State Emergency 
Declaration and a statewide surge level that requires a Federal Emergency Declaration. 
The California Department of Public Health Standards and Guidelines for Healthcare 
Surge During Emergencies:Volume 1 gives hospitals and other healthcare facilities 
definitions, actions and expectations for managing medical surge (California Department 
of Public Health 2008) There are companion operational tools, manuals, and training 
guides with comprehensive information that is shared statewide with stakeholders. A 
priority for California EOM is training for all six mutual aid regions. Training by Public 
Health and EMA allows each region to share their surge plans and learn how to integrate 
the regional plans.  
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Statewide exercises in California are complex and involve many disciplines and 
the use of public and private resources, military response, state teams and caches of 
equipment and supplies. The exercises are used to validate notification and response 
systems and measure the integration of resources as written in the EOM. As exercises are 
evaluated and improvement plans are completed, California makes changes to improve 
the integration of resources among agencies. California’s plan to quickly identify surge 
and take action to move resources to hospitals is supported by the location of medical 
caches and the expectations for medical response teams deployment. At the time of this 
research, California was planning an exercise to mobilize, deploy, and exercise two forty-
bed alternate care sites with medical caches using the DMAT and other disaster 
volunteers.  
2. California Response  
There are many assets located across California that are dedicated to manage 
medical surge. Mission Support Teams (MST) coordinated through Emergency Medical 
Services Authority (EMSA) use the incident command structure to deploy Mobile 
Medical Assets (MMA). Team members are trained personnel that originate from local 
response agencies. Deployable assets include Ambulance Strike Teams (AST), Disaster 
Medical Response Units (DMSU), Medical Assistance Teams (Cal-MATs), Disaster 
Healthcare Volunteers (DHV), and Mobile Field Hospitals (MFH). The assets move into 
an impacted area and provide medical support for large mass casualty incidents. 
Actual numbers in the literature vary; however, it is estimated that there are over 
thirty DMSUs that provide ASTs, and have three 40-person medical assistance teams at 
the ready for disaster response. Guidelines for EMS field treatment are being developed 
by EMSA and will be coordinated with ACS and medical shelter guidelines. There are 
five DMAT teams listed by EMSA, each with 100 or more members. Deployment of 35–
50 members provides medical and health care services.  The DMAT teams have been 
essential for supporting ACS operations.    
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Support teams in California include forty two Medical Reserve Corps with 7,000 
members and a total of 20,000 registered disaster healthcare volunteers (DHV) across the 
State. The DHV system is divided into a Northern and Southern California division, with 
four local units in each division. The DHV is in the process of modification to reflect 
each unit as part of CAL-MAT deployment and mission management. Credentialed 
volunteers are an important part of medical response and are utilized to fill gaps in 
staffing.   
The volunteer response common operational framework is outlined in the DHV 
Deployment Operations Manual operations manual and identifies management, 
credentialing and deployment of volunteers between operational areas. The use of 
guidelines and checklists provides consistency for using medical volunteers for medical 
surge response (California Emergency Medical Services Authority 2012). The MRC, 
through private sponsorships and disaster relief organization support, provides volunteers 
with basic life support supply backpacks used for mass casualty incidents. Three 
standardized equipment caches for CAL-MAT supports small specialty team 
deployments. 
In 2006, California purchased three mobile field hospitals that include vendor 
support for maintenance and deployment.  Each hospital has 200 beds, and is strategically 
located in California to facilitate a timely response.  In an effort to support the mobile 
field hospitals a site selection tool is used to identify sites that would accommodate a 
MFH. Currently, there are eighty MFH sites identified.   
In the event that patients need to be moved from the disaster impacted area to an 
un-impacted area, there is a Statewide Patient Movement Plan under development with 
input from UASI and the California National Guard. Patient movement requires 
significant resources and coordination. Developing a plan provides a framework and 
identifies resources to effectively move patients. One method to manage surge is to move 
patients to non-surged hospitals. The movement of patients within the first hours to days 
is the Ambulance Strike Teams/Medical Task Forces (AST/MTF). An AST Type I ALS 
and Type II BLS, consists of five ambulances, with two medical personnel, and one strike 
team leader in a separate response vehicle. Each AST is self-sufficient for 72 hours, and 
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can provide immediate local EMS integration to evacuate, respond to an incident or move 
patients during a disaster. An MTF as a mixed group of resources for example, Type I 
and Type II ambulances can together make up the five ambulance compliment and 
become a response asset. The AST can also provide longer term resources for medical 
and health support as needed. This asset has training for personnel, includes a task book 
for completion to become eligible to deploy. An operational manual and MOUs for AST 
deployment is available. 
3. Florida Plans 
Florida Chapter 943.0313 F.S. identifies the Florida Domestic Security Oversight 
Council (DSOC) as the structure and organization for state preparedness and response to 
terrorism and other naturally occurring disasters. The DSOC is responsible for planning 
and coordination among state agencies. The structure provides state-level leadership for 
prioritizing emergency preparedness and response projects and expenditures. Shortly 
after 9/11, the state developed seven domestic security regions to manage and share 
information and intelligence in the state. These seven Regional Domestic Security Task 
Force (RDSTF) regions are able to collaborate by a multidisciplinary task force structure 
under Florida Chapter 943.0312 F.S. The seven RDSTF regions meet at least quarterly to 
share information, identify needs and initiate projects that are relevant to domestic 
security in their region. Health and medical business of a region is often conducted 
through a sub-committee of the RDSTF (Florida Department of Law Enforcement 2013). 
Florida Chapter 252 F.S. identifies the Florida Department of Health Emergency 
Coordination Officer responsible for coordination of health and medical preparedness 
activities. The State CEMP ESF-8 annex identifies Health and Medical Services. 
Between 2001–2006, Florida received the maximum amount of federal bio-terrorism 
funds available through CDC, DHS, and HRSA, totaling $334,156,294 (Office of 
Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability 2007). Expenditures improved 
lab capacity, delivered training and exercises, hired public health staff, and bought 
equipment and supplies. Over $14 million was spent on building regional surge capacity.  
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The Florida Department of Health uses a strategic planning process to develop a 
two year plan to address six goals and twenty one objectives to meet national and state 
domestic security priorities for minimizing loss of life, illness and injury from natural and 
man-made disasters. The plan is developed by a team of members of the RDSTF with 
healthcare partners. The Strategic Plan Oversight Team (SPOT) is comprised of 
interdisciplinary members that serve as the advisory body to focus on priorities, resource 
allocation, and for monitoring progress in meeting strategic objectives. The Division of 
Emergency Medical Operations (DEMO) with the Bureau of Preparedness and Response 
(BPR) provides support to the counties for healthcare system preparedness.  
The Emergency Operations base plan with functional annexes and appendices 
provides guidance for the operational tactical plans. Standard operating procedures 
describe the process for Incident Command, coordinated situational awareness, and 
resource management to meet local mission needs. The Florida CEMP is the master 
operations document for the State (Florida Division of Emergency Management 2012). 
The base plan outlines the mission of ESF-8 as coordinating public health and medical 
resources, capabilities, capacities, and response in an all hazards environment during 
natural or man-made disasters. The goal is to develop an integrated and comprehensive 
statewide health and medical response system. Within the Florida CEMP, are appendices 
applicable to this research, ESF-8, Ambulance Deployment, Alternative Medical 
Treatment Sites, and hospital response. The ESF8 appendix outlines support agencies and 
organizations including public, private and non-governmental support organizations that 
provide resources to the Florida DOH (Florida Division of Emergency Management 
2012). One support agency that is critical to the mission is the Agency for Health Care 
Administration (AHCA) for identifying available hospital bed space though Emergency 
Status System (ESS). The ESS system provides a website for hospitals to report current 
status and available resources to assist in daily and disaster operations.     
At the State Emergency Operations Center, ESF-8 takes a prominent position to 
coordinate resources and share information between the Florida DOH Emergency 
Coordinating Officer and a Florida Hospital Association representative. These positions 
work directly with healthcare facilities and county health departments 
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during disaster operations to identify unmet needs. ESF-8 Incident Action Plans and 
Situation Reports are developed during each operational period and are shared with each 
of the seven RDSTF regions and local healthcare stakeholders.  
Healthcare coalitions in Florida are either fully developed or in the process of 
being formed with the goal of having healthcare coalitions in all communities by 2017. 
ASPR has made healthcare coalition a priority in grant guidance. There are sixteen 
coalitions identified and are expected to have cooperative agreements and create an 
infrastructure where the community healthcare partners provide support to one another 
within the coalition for managing medical surge.  
4. Florida Response 
Florida has dedicated mobile resources to respond to medical surge. The State 
Medical Response System (SMRS) provides medical care and infrastructure operations to 
regional and local jurisdictions where public health and medical infrastructure are 
overwhelmed (Florida Department of Health 2012).  
The State Logistical Response Center (SLRC) located in Orlando has $32 million 
of assets in a 200,000 square foot warehouse. Florida has had frequent threats and 
landfall of hurricanes where resources are supported under a Governor and Presidential 
declaration. Each disaster has improved state preparedness through analyzing gaps in 
response. The evaluation of response and subsequent changes in plans, better serve 
response and recovery efforts for the citizens and visitors to FL. In addition to the EM 
asset the SLRC with dedicated space for DOH, there is a state warehouse specifically 
dedicated to storing supplies and equipment for health and medical response. This 
warehouse is augmented by other resource warehouses located in some of the RDSTF 
regions. 
Caches of medical supplies and equipment, trailers, and dedicated prime movers 
are available to move resources when and where they are needed.  In some instances, 
logistical support teams can pre-deploy resources to stage in anticipation of a need. State 
Medical Response System (SMRS) caches can provide primary care for 100 persons for 
3–5 days. Through the ASPR program, hospitals have acquired supplies and equipment, 
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along with training and exercises, to best meet the potential impact of surge on their 
individual facility. Hospitals have also become a partner with the CDC to store caches of 
antidotes to manage the effects on patients from biological and chemical attacks. 
State Medical Response Teams (SMRT) and/or caches are located in all RDSTF 
regions. SMRT teams can mobilize within eight hours of activation and become 
operational within 8–24 hours. SMRS teams are self-sufficient for a minimum of 72 
hours. The personnel composition of SMRT teams is derived from the DMAT model and 
as a team can respond more quickly than federal DMATs because of the proximity to the 
area they serve. The MRC in Florida has 18,000 volunteers. The MRC units respond to 
mission requests for medical support and participate in exercises with DMAT and state 
medical response teams. Exercises have included the use of the MRC for providing 
medical surge support at alternate care sites.  
Each RDSTF region has a Regional Emergency Response Advisor (RERA) who 
is a public health asset. A RERA can serve multiple roles and has a dedicated vehicle 
with emergency lights to respond to public health emergencies. During disasters the 
RERA moves equipment and supplies, respond to suspicious substance calls and do field 
damage assessments. The RERA may act as a regional coordinating officer with county 
coordinators to best manage regional disasters before requesting state resources. A public 
health preparedness county coordinator is assigned to each county to develop plans, 
conduct exercise, provide training, and to complete surveys and ensure the health 
department meets preparedness competency requirements. During disasters, the 
coordinator may become the ESF-8 representative at the county EOC. The coordinator 
position is dependent upon the goals of the county health department administrator.     
Larger hospital systems have caches of equipment and supplies, prime movers, 
and disaster response personnel to manage medical surge. In past disasters, corporate 
hospital systems have provided resources to hospitals outside their system as a goodwill 
mission and as part of community support. In Florida, the Veterans Administration has 
two healthcare systems, seven medical centers and up to fifty clinics. The VA facilities 
have participated in countywide drills and exercises making them a valuable partner in 
the community to provide access to federal resources for medical surge management.  
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Florida has three tractor-trailer platform mobile hospitals. There are also available 
inflatable and shelter systems that can provide treatment and can expand to the needs of 
the mission. The mobile field hospitals can become a replacement for an inoperable 
emergency department or augment one that is overwhelmed.  
5. Alternate Care Sites  
California and Florida have similar plans and criteria for establishing alternate 
care sites for medical surge management. Each state identifies surge criteria to implement 
the use of an ACS.    
California has an estimated 21,000 ACS beds, and has exercised medical surge 
and alternate care site plans. There are Healthcare Surge Standards and Guidelines 
Manuals, operational tools and training materials for facilities and counties. In the 
standards and guidelines document there are volumes specific to hospitals, alternate care 
sites, community care clinics and long term care facilities (California Department of 
Public Health, 2008). The California Hospital Association provides the Hospital Surge 
Checklist and Resources to assist with the development of plans for surge events 
(California Hospital Association 2013). 
There are recommendations for patient throughput in an ACS that would 
effectively manage surge. In catastrophic mass casualty incidents, each ACS should 
prepare to treat 75–125 patients per hour (Florida Department of Health Pre-Hospital 
Planning Emergency Medical Response 2006, 32). Three documents guide ACS use: 
Alternate Care Site Operational Guidance, Alternate Care Sites: Local Plan 
Development Guide, and Florida Alternate Care Site Standard Operating Procedure 
(Florida Department of Health 2013, 2). Florida DOH has exercised ACS plans at the 
county levels, and through ASPR funding has enabled hospitals to purchase shelters and 
supplies to establish ACS when needed. There are thirty one local ACS plans on file with 
the Florida DOH and others are in different stages of development. Hospitals have made 
significant progress in identifying surge space.  In addition, Florida has provided twenty 
three mass casualty trailers to EMS and Fire Rescue departments for the purpose of triage 
and field treatment.  
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E. SUMMARY OF FACTORS 
Federal funding from HHS in 2013 includes $332 million, decreased by -$124 
million from 2012, to support federal, state and local capacity and capabilities in 
emergencies. These funds support the hospital preparedness program (HPP) with the 
focus on six areas, three related to this thesis are; community-level medical surge 
planning, evacuation planning and maximizing public and private partnerships. The HPP 
grant guidance is changing from building preparedness capacity to a competitive grant 
program for innovation among healthcare coalitions and sustainment of preparedness 
capacity and healthcare coalitions and their partners. The HPP will advance the efforts of 
ASPRs to integrate state and local public health and medical surge capability by aligning 
the HPP and PHEP grants. There is $5 million to support planned and unplanned 
emergencies including support of NDMS (DMAT) teams and supplies (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund 2013, 
18). A budget request for NDMS of $52 million is to support among others, regional 
emergency coordination, medical response assets, and teams and supplies (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health and Social Services 
Emergency Fund 2013, 32). The funding helps support the six DMAT teams each in 
Florida and California. Additional 2013 funding through HSPG grants to urban areas for 
California is over $50 million, and for Florida is $8.5 million. The HSPG priority focus is 
on strengthening governance integration to ensure resources support the coordination of 
funding streams based on risk and capabilities based planning. Program priorities that 
were added are the innovation and sustained support for the National Campaign for 
Preparedness and improve immediate emergency victim care at mass casualty events 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security Grant Program 2013, 3).  
More attention to the geographical and organizational coordination of 
NDMS, MMRS, and the disaster medical response teams is needed.  It is 
not clear how the DMATs relate to the MMRS and how well each local 
MMRS functions and relates to key organizations such as the major 
hospitals, academic health centers, health care systems, and others in their 
community. (Cooksey 2004)  
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Seamless articulation of resources is an important part of managing medical 
surge. Initial medical staff response will benefit from having credentialed medical staff 
from outside the agency to augment care capability. The ability to obtain resources from 
various sources gives medical facilities the best advantage in medical surge management. 
 
 
Figure 4.  MSCC Management Organization Strategy (From Barbera and MacIntyre 
2007) 
The Medical Surge Capacity and Capability (MSCC) strategy (Figure 4) shows 
the various levels of disaster medical management. The tiers show individual healthcare 
organizations or assets and the integration with a coalition, region, state, and federal 
agencies.  Each tier builds upon the other as resources—as each tier is expended, resource 
requests move to the next tier. The 2013 DHS initiatives are emphasizing whole 
community involvement and public-private collaboration for planning and response.  
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Articulation of resources among local, state, and federal levels are key to having 
what is needed at the right time and the right place to treat patients in the medical surge. 
The Preparedness: Federal Medical Response Programs and the Health Workforce study 
identify gaps in Federal response and for coordination with local communities (Cooksey 
2004). Collaboration across all levels is essential to lessen the response times, improve 
staffing plans, best utilize space, and acquire the most appropriate medical caches to do 
the best care for the most disaster survivors.   
The FEMA is not waiting for state and local government failure before 
intervening; however, with limited federal funding, resources are becoming scarcer and 
the eligibility threshold for disaster support is increasing. Federal agencies have worked 
together and independently to achieve a level of response to provide direct patient care 
using resources and personnel from the various levels of government. It becomes 
complicated when a community or a state has the expectation that the Federal 
government will intervene in a timely manner. Deployment of federal resources can take 
days before reaching the requestor, and longer to become operational. If simultaneous 
disasters occur, the response time may be increased. This gap between request for 
resources and them becoming operational requires communities to plan for the worst case 
scenario upward of 72 hours or more. Leaders from the medical and health sectors need 
to become familiar with the two medical response systems (NDMS and MMRS) within 
their local area. At the national level, health care leaders need to identify a process to 
work with the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and 
Human Services on the emergency preparedness and response mission and the strategy 
being pursued by these departments and other federal agencies (Cooksey 2004). 
Healthcare systems must think differently from daily business of delivering 
healthcare services. It requires agreements like EMAC and IMAC with healthcare 
systems or coalitions and among and between healthcare agencies and stakeholders to 
reach across geographic boundaries, and healthcare facility philosophies to get the most 
benefit from a coordinated system for disaster management.  Integration with federal 
initiatives has happened in California and Florida at various levels. State teams act as a 
link between the local and federal levels or may act to support local response without the 
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need for a federal response. Embedded in each state, are six DMAT teams, the 
MRC with 20,000 in California and 18,000 in Florida, Citizen Corp, and the MMRS. 
These teams have been instrumental in medical surge management in each state and can 
act as a resource to other states.  
Federal funding has been directed toward the development of State Medical 
Response teams which are similar to Federal DMATs and can usually respond more 
quickly to augment local needs. State disaster response however does not simply plug 
into a community or into the federal system without planning. A comparison of 
California and Florida identifies how both states have dedicated resources and organized 
capabilities though planning.  Perhaps because of their experience with disaster response, 
both states identify options for articulation with local communities and with federal 
response resources. This is especially obvious with DMATs, a federal asset interfacing 
with a state medical response teams. Both state and federal teams provide trained and 
credential medical personnel that can arrive and begin to care for disaster survivors. 
California and Florida have resources to manage disaster medical surge and have teams 
in place that can integrate with local medical professionals or with federal teams. These 
states have embedded partnerships within the healthcare community some formally 
developed into healthcare coalitions to provide alternatives at the local and often 
regional levels for filling gaps with medical caches and medical response team through 
MOUs that can redirect assets that will best manage the complexity of the situation.  
Comparisons of medical surge management in California and Florida are similar. 
The states have built a framework with guidance and legislation within Public Health and 
Emergency Management sectors for coordinated response to disasters. California and 
Florida have experience responding to natural disasters and have had incidents causing 
medical surge. These experiences have required assistance from other states through 
EMAC, the federal government though NDMS, and the military though the National 
Guard. Disasters and simulations during exercises allow the states to assess response and 
make improvements that streamline policies and procedures for medical surge 
management.  
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Decompressing hospitals, or redirecting surge away from a hospital to increase 
clinical space, requires a robust patient movement plan to be effective in the early stages 
of a disaster. California and Florida have identified government authorized alternate care 
sites. In both states the process for establishing alternate care sites for the management of 
medical surge has worked. There is a heavy reliance on local community support from 
healthcare facilities to manage medical surge and to continue to build public-private 
partnerships may make more resources available.   
California and Florida have made efforts toward redirecting patients away from 
overwhelmed hospitals or from the scene of an incident by establishing Ambulance Strike 
Teams to move patients within the healthcare system or to non-impacted medical 
facilities.  A plan for mobilizing 50 ambulances within 10 minutes after a blast with at 
least 75% arriving at the staging area within one hour and the remainder within 90 
minutes is suggested in the HHS CDC document, In a Moment’s Notice:Surge Capacity 
for Terrorist Bombings (Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention 2007). 
The AST policies and procedures are similar in California and in Florida. The 
ambulance strike team concept for moving patients does have some challenges with 
integration into the impacted area. Literature discusses problems with communications, 
command and control of ambulance tasking and strikes teams becoming separated and 
working on different missions. This is a topic for another researcher. In previous 
disasters, Florida and California have received support from the military with ground and 
air patient movement assets in addition to on the ground assistance by military medical 
teams. The strong presence of military bases and Veterans Administration healthcare 
facilities within Florida and California can lead to efficient planning and response.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Ultimately, effective surge response requires all stakeholders to accept 
new responsibilities, behave differently than they may have been trained, 
and cooperate with each other in unprecedented ways. (California 
Department of Public Health 2008 14) 
This thesis asks the following three questions to determine what individual 
resources, or those in coordination, can best manage or minimize the impact of medical 
surge that overwhelms a healthcare system during a disaster. Federal resources and those 
within the States of California and Florida support this inquiry. The results of the 
comparative analysis were used to answer the questions for federal and state resources 
and the use of alternate care sites to manage medical surge.   
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. What are the alternatives for the management of medical surge during a 
disaster?  
The management of medical surge may begin with a single healthcare facility and 
can move to collaborating and coordinating within the whole community and with 
continued escalation can involve state and federal resources. California and Florida have 
identified alternatives at the state level to manage medical surge through the use of 
alternate care sites. Each state has plans and guidance for how to access federal resources, 
teams, equipment and supplies, patient evacuation and movement. Although existent, it is 
less coordinated from the state level to local levels. The challenge may be due to much of 
healthcare is in the private sector. Without private sector support for public plans, it 
becomes a more silo approach. Federal agencies are using grant guidance to encourage 
the development of healthcare coalitions to bring community partners together to 
coordinate resources (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, ASPR, CDC 
2012). 
Management of resources is a community responsibility as medical surge begins 
at the local level and becomes unmanageable for a single medical facility. One alternative 
for increasing the capacity and capability for providing patient care is to redirect non-
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critical disaster survivors to an alternate care site located on hospital property or in the 
community. To redirect non-critical patients to an ACS, can leave hospital resources for 
the more critical patients arriving to the hospital. To match the criticality of patients with 
the sufficiency of care can maximize resources and provide the highest level of definitive 
care. 
To determine the capability for a community to surge, it becomes important to 
assess the amount and type of resources available. To adequately evaluate the whole 
community from the perspective of resources requires the involvement and input by a 
variety of healthcare agencies, non-governmental organizations, public and private 
organizations and local, state and federal responders. To bring the stakeholders together 
can become challenging. One model being used in California and in Florida is to develop 
Disaster Healthcare Coalitions. The use of coalitions provides for effective planning and 
for the assessment of resources at the local level. Plans are written for the community 
rather than specific to individual organizations and facilities.   
State and the federal resources may be delayed so it becomes necessary for self-
sufficiency in the initial hours. If not managed, surge may overwhelm staff, resources, 
and space. Essentially, the facility becomes unable to provide medical care. Preplanning 
of ACS sites and a strategy for the deployment of medical resources and staff can save 
valuable time, making those decisions in the midst of a disaster. Alternate care locations 
can be established close to an incident or close to the hospital.  
2. How can alternate care sites improve the capacity and/or capability of 
a healthcare system during a disaster?  
An ACS can improve capacity by redirecting the less injured away from the 
hospital or outside the traditional healthcare system. The less injured and those that self-
evacuate the scene can be redirected to an ACS to receive services like wound care, 
mental health services and less complex injury management. The movement of medical 
surge can improve capability as the most critical are cared for at the hospital and the less 
injured receive care at an ACS. The mixture of patients in one location can cause delays 
in patient throughput and increase time to receive care.  
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Redirection of patients can be facilitated by EMS at triage points close to the 
scene or at the hospital campus away from the emergency department. If EMS is required 
by protocols or legislative mandate to transport patients only to emergency departments 
this increases the number of patients waiting for care and increases surge. An alternative 
for hospitals is to triage patients brought by EMS and redirect the less injured to an 
alternate site. This redirection can increase the emergency department’s capacity by 
leaving available beds or surge beds inside the hospital.  
Once the demand for resources exceeds the supply a higher potential exists for 
poor patient outcomes including death and disability. Moving the less critical to an ACS 
expands the capacity and capability of the entire healthcare system. The ACS system can 
provide care and facilitate a more rapid discharge of the less injured alleviating the need 
for costly bed space. The ACS concept needs to be rapidly deployable to ensure the 
greatest benefit. There may be times when disasters are so large and complex 
(catastrophic) that it is like a tsunami of people seeking care. At those times, an ACS or 
more than one can do the best for the most by accurately triaging and providing sufficient 
care to patients.  
The use of an ACS takes significant support of the healthcare system and 
community partners. It requires a collaborative and coordinated effort toward making 
resources available. Staff from one local facility can move to another local facility to 
support surge under an agreement. The use of MOU agreements for staff and supplies can 
provide for a more timely response especially as surge expands at one hospital leaving 
less resources to provide patient care.  The availability of mobile caches of equipment 
and supplies and medical response teams becomes essential to creating an ACS. The use 
of an Alternate Care Site is less about the physical plant for where the care takes place 
and more about the teams and supplies in the overall system that can do the most good 
within the available healthcare system.  
3. Would using an alternate care site for medical surge challenge 
community and healthcare system policies, procedures, practices, and regulations?  
Communities and healthcare systems adopting the ACS concept may be 
challenged when trying to collaborate for resources to effectively and efficiently manage 
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medical surge. There are many regulations and mandates required for licensed facilities 
and professionals when providing medical care to patients. These include EMTALA, 
JCAHO, professional practice acts, EMS standards, and policies specific to the delivery 
of healthcare services. In a disaster, some of these policies are relaxed when an 
emergency declaration is issued however medical facilities are reluctant to work outside 
these policies. The use of an ACS must address the issues of EMS requirements for 
transporting patients to the closest most appropriate hospitals, the requirement by 
EMTALA under 42 CFR 413.65: A person who presents anywhere on the hospital 
campus (250-yard zone) and requests emergency services, or who would appear to a 
reasonably prudent person to be in need of medical attention, must be handled under 
EMTALA (Government Accountability Office 2008). As ACS protocols are being 
developed, hospitals must look toward the use of an HHS waiver under Section 1135 of 
the Social Security Act, which allows for care to be done for the greatest good for the 
greatest number with a focus of providing care with existing capacity (Center for Bio-
Security of UPMC 2009). Healthcare as a business, risks financial loss for being liable 
for untoward outcomes while caring for patients. The use of a waiver may provide 
liability protection for hospitals and the medical professionals providing care. 
Professional practice acts, for healthcare workers including nurses and physicians, 
are required to provide a specific standard of care to patients when planning for ACS 
implementation. In a disaster, caring for many patients versus single patients may 
compromise specific patient ratios outlined in medical practice acts. Current healthcare 
systems would benefit from rapidly credentialing and integrating public health and 
medical personnel into the system, so direct patient care services can be provided during 
surge. The lack of national standards for the deployment and use of public health and 
medical emergency response personnel and the use of spontaneous volunteer health 
practitioners may become problematic unless credentialing systems are in place. This 
may become especially challenging when medical professionals respond across 
geographic boundaries (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2006). 
The culmination of the literature and analysis of federal and state plans and assets, 
has led to the following conclusions. 
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B. POSITIVE RESULTS  
States refers to Florida and California. Federal refers to different agencies that 
provide support to the states. 
 Federal agencies have responded with guidance that supports unified 
management of disasters that cause mass casualties and ultimately 
medical surge (HSPDs, NRP, UTL, and TCL).  
 Federal funding is available to support the purchase of medical equipment 
and supplies (ASPR, CDC, HSPG, and HHP). 
 Federal support exists for training and exercises (NIMS, HSEEP).  
 Federal agencies have funded teams (DMAT, MRC) across the nation to 
respond to disasters and augment or develop medical infrastructure for 
disaster impacted communities (NDMS, MMRS). 
 Federal agencies are improving coordination with states through the 
FEMA regional concept (FEMA).  
 States have utilized federal funding opportunities to support development 
of statewide strategies and healthcare coalitions for disaster response 
(ASPR, CDC). 
 States have made efforts toward collaboration across geographical lines 
(EMAC). 
 States have plans in place for alternate care sites and methods for treating 
large numbers of disaster survivors (ACS plans, State response teams, 
caches). 
 States have identified response teams to be available to deploy to for 
medical surge disasters (State Medical Response Teams). 
C. CHALLENGES  
 All disasters are local and may exceed 72-hours, making it necessary for 
communities and healthcare systems to be self-sufficient for a period of 
time before federal assistance is available. 
 Disaster survivors arrive at hospitals in the first minutes with a peak in the 
first hour and continue over six hours straining resources and staff.  




 Ambulances lack the capacity to transport large numbers leaving a gap for 
moving patients without additional ambulance support.  
 EMS may follow existing protocols and bring survivors to the closest 
hospital and may not have the authority or option to vary transport 
protocols to include transportation to an ACS.  
 Healthcare systems and hospitals are often private businesses, and are not 
required to work with the government toward medical surge preparedness 
in the community.  
 Healthcare facilities may be reluctant to enter into agreements with 
competing facilities for disaster response.  
 Communities may have difficulty bringing stakeholders together to 
develop one whole community plan for medical surge management.  
 States have addressed aspects of the federal guidance; however, many are 
not have the coordination with local communities.  
 Locally, healthcare disaster preparedness is often placed on the largest 
healthcare facility in a particular community.  
 Disaster healthcare is costly and reimbursement is not always an option 
when providing medical surge care. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The idea that all disasters are local becomes a challenge when an incident causing 
multiple casualties impacts a community. The most common gap to emerge in this 
research was the lack of a clear coordinated strategy at the local level for managing 
medical surge. The federal funding and guidance has helped states to develop plans 
however it is less apparent that there is a consistent method in local communities to 
prepare for and respond to medical surge. The healthcare infrastructure must be 
responsive to deliver care for those that self-evacuate and those that arrive by ambulance. 
The challenge is to have plans in place, to exercise the plans and make adjustments to 
accommodate a variety of disaster casualties. It requires a collaboration of healthcare 
facilities with other stakeholders to develop community support for sharing resources and 
establishing ACS.  
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Federal and state governments have provided guidance and funding to support the 
management of disaster medical surge; however on the whole, these are insufficient and 
have failed to scale in proportion to the demands placed on local communities. It is 
necessary to do more. Healthcare is expensive. The costs exponentially increase during 
disaster care.  A mechanism should be in place to make communities accountable to 
receive funds and provide guidance that will allow communities to articulate with states 
and then the federal response mechanisms. This articulation among and between the 
levels will lessen the burden on each level while providing care. It is no longer sufficient 
for disaster surge management to be the burden of the local healthcare system. Rather a 
collaborative system of response must be in place to coordinate care.  
In the initial hours following a disaster causing mass casualties, Emergency 
Medical Services responds to the scene. In the initial phases, EMS will triage, provide 
immediate care, package the patient and transport to the nearest medical facility. The 
time it takes for EMS to perform their tasks on scene, allows self-evacuees to surge the 
Emergency Department. Once a surge occurs, limited resources including a lack of 
capacity and capability ensues. It is essential for hospitals to articulate to the healthcare 
community that this could compromise patient care and lead to increased death and 
disability. Public information and education of disaster expectations may be helpful. 
EMS has an additional role with the AST which can move patients and assist to 
decompress a hospital, transfer patients to un-impacted facilities, and provide staffing at 
an ACS. 
Communities must work together in a multidisciplinary manner to manage 
disaster medical surge. This requires bringing together healthcare agencies, law 
enforcement, EMS, emergency management, NGOs, religious and community 
organizations together to form a disaster healthcare coalition to determine the following:  
1. EMS Response  
Consideration for changing EMS transport operations when faced with disasters is 
necessary. It is essential that local and state protocols and laws include a mechanism to 
allow for the transport of less critical patients to facilities, including alternate care sites 
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that can provide sufficient care. EMS agencies can be instrumental in redirecting non-
critical patients that would cause hospital surge to alternate sites away from hospital 
emergency departments.  This redirection would be based upon field triage allowing for 
the movement of the most critical to the hospitals and the less injured or ill to alternate 
care sites.  
2. Capacity of Healthcare Systems  
Each community should assess the total number of beds in the clinical space 
within the healthcare system. This number is the capacity or the number of patients that 
can occupy a bed. In addition, the surge capacity should be assessed. This is determined 
by expanding into non-clinical space that can be converted into clinical space to 
accommodate disaster patients. This number of increased beds can be utilized to predict 
surge capacity. It is difficult to determine how many disaster survivors will arrive so it 
becomes necessary to have plans to expand capacity to manage surge.  
Attention toward developing mutual aid or memoranda of agreements will allow 
other healthcare facilities to provide surge space. When faced with disaster medical 
surge, hospitals must have the ability to redirect the less injured to alternate locations for 
care which may be other medical facilities with space. Alternate care sites with 
predetermined deployment strategies, strengthens a community’s ability to understand 
surge capacity within a locale.  
3. Capability of Healthcare Systems  
The capacity must be partnered with knowing the capability of the healthcare 
system. The capability includes the baseline level of daily services provided in a 
community, region or state during non-disaster times. The number and level of trauma 
centers is a consideration. Availability of rehabilitation, behavioral health services, public 
health services and other healthcare provider services in a healthcare system is part of the 
capacity. This includes level, credentials, and type and number of staff, and the supplies 
and equipment that can provide care for disaster survivors.  
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In a disaster, expanding staff to provide care can be accomplished by recall or by 
moving to 12-hour rotations, called alpha and bravo shifts. This shift configuration has 
historically been done during disasters with financial burden to the facility for the 
overtime. Recall may not be effective if the recalled staff are personally impacted by the 
disaster or are unable get to work due to failure of transportation infrastructure.  
Alternative staffing can come from other patient care areas or by using licensed medical 
staff from  non- patient care areas like administration. Credentialed medical volunteers 
like those members of medical response teams or MRC also become a staffing option 
during a disaster. DMAT and MRC volunteers are credentialed prior to deployment and 
can become an asset in surge. 
Staff capability for spontaneous medical volunteers or those from other healthcare 
systems requires a process for credentialing.  Healthcare agencies and systems would 
benefit from having a predetermined process that would quickly identify, credential, and 
assign staff to areas of expertise to maximize utilization.  
Capability includes medical resources, supplies, equipment and pharmaceuticals. 
An inventory of  a communities resources is part of planning for a disaster. Just in time 
ordering has created a challenge for healthcare systems to have residual stock of supplies. 
Vendor management may include a clause in the contract that will support a facility 
during a disaster. This can become a challenge if the same vendor is utilized by many of 
the impacted facilities, and potentially creates a medical supply shortage. 
4. Challenges to Surge Management  
It is prudent to recognize that other considerations to surge management might be 
explored in future research. Topics to explore include how to alter medical care standards 
and protocols, and clearly define sufficiency of care when faced with surge from a 
disaster. The model must evolve from a focus on single patient care to one which is 
dynamic and scalable.  This new model may in fact minimize or substitute heretofore 
standard practices such as early diagnostics to provide, a higher level of care while doing 
the best for the most disaster survivors.  
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During a disaster when the demand for medical supplies, equipment, and 
pharmaceuticals exceeds the supply rationing may be instituted. When rationing, the 
decision-making process by medical professionals becomes an ethical dilemma.  The 
healthcare professional may be required to determine who lives and who dies given the 
resources. This is an issue that is not often faced when caring for one patient at a time. In 
a disaster scenario, healthcare professionals will find themselves making difficult 
decisions that may not be comfortable, or have not been exposed to such in medical 
training or for ethical decision making.  
To predict the number and the types of medical professionals required to 
adequately staff for medical surge may be explored by retrospective research.  To manage 
a disaster, some facilities activate a full staff recall. This process impacts the length of 
time for healthcare system recovery because of the inability to backfill tired staff. There 
is a financial impact for loss of revenue during response to and recovering from a disaster 
causing medical surge.  Human resource costs for overtime and backfill is significant and 
takes time to financially recover. These and other topics should be considered when 
caring for disaster medical surge survivors, though are not included in this thesis.  
5. Alternate Care Site  
An ACS can be a fixed location or a mobile complement which can expand 
capacity. It can be set up at or near the epicenter of the disaster or can be at a location 
near the hospital where many disaster survivors will self-evacuate. Although states have 
successfully implemented ACS unless it is rapidly deployable it is not effective for the 
initial phase of surge. Therefore, establishment of an ACS to lessen medical disaster 
surge must include partnerships of healthcare provider stakeholders and by supporting 
agencies like emergency management, law enforcement and public health. The 
development of a disaster healthcare coalition that can develop plans, have an inventory 
of medical supplies and equipment, and include staffing matrixes, can be an asset to 
response efforts.  Agreements by a coalition could address credentialing, deployment and 
utilization of an Alternate Care Site. An ACS can lessen surge by having the less injured 
referred or transported by EMS. If a community lacks a hospital, an ACS can also 
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prevent long transport times for movement of disaster survivors. Basic care without 
displacement from the community is an advantage of using an ACS.  This also can 
include the use of the MRC or DMAT as staffing. In a disaster medical surge, ESF-8 
would be lead for determining where to access staff. Similarly, supplies can also be 
redirected or caches can be accessed to provide care. If facilities are unable to 
accommodate capacity, an alternate care site model can be developed where facilities in 
the coalition can move staff to the alternate site and add to whole community capabilities. 
Simply put, an alternate care site is not always a specific location or a tent erected 
in a parking lot. It is a concept to expand the healthcare system to manage medical surge 
following a disaster. It is a concept that can include pre-planned locations or a process to 
divert disaster survivors to another location that can provide minimal care, while 
lessening the surge on the entire system. An alternate care site can be existing healthcare 
facilities that are not typically used for acute care. The alternate care site concept is one 
that requires staff, stuff, space, and a system to achieve its goals of expanding care to an 
increased number. The success of an ACS is predicated on working together at local, 
state, and federal levels to ensure its capacity and capability.  
6. Disaster Healthcare Coalitions  
A coalition can determine the needs of the community based upon the current 
capacity and capability. A coalition is instrumental for the development of a plan to 
manage disaster medical surge in the immediate hours following a disaster. A coalition 
authored plan can work to identify disaster survivor movement from the hospital where 
most self-evacuate and redirect to other coalition member healthcare facilities. The idea 
of acute care or management of disaster survivors may be different than the facilities 
daily mission. It entails collaboration, cooperation and communication between and 
among the members from public and private sectors and from organizations that can 
support the mission. An analogy may be drawn by a bulls-eye, where emergent patients 




to other facilities on the bulls-eye. This process will allow the coalition members to seek 
a place within the circles where they can provide support and services. Collectively, the 
bulls-eye is how a community can manage surge.   
E. CONCLUSION 
The management of medical surge is complex, requiring dedicated resources from 
federal, state, and local government levels. The resources must include medical response 
teams, supplies, and equipment, surge space, and plans to operationalize medical surge 
mitigation strategies in a timely manner. The use of ACSs may allow the disaster 
survivors that are less injured to receive care while leaving critical space at the hospital 
for the most injured.  The use of state and federal resources to augment a local healthcare 
system during medical surge is difficult and often lacks clear articulation between the 
levels. This delay in resources arriving to an impacted disaster area leaves local 
governments having to be self-sufficient. States that have resources do not have the same 
plans to use those resources. The federal government provides guidance, frameworks, and 
documents that help with planning; however, lacks the true infrastructure to manage 
medical surge.   
Our national preparedness is the shared responsibility of all levels of government, 
the private and non-profit sectors, and individual citizens (Obama PPD-8 2011). 
All disasters are local, and require the commitment of many partners within and 
outside the healthcare community. The forum for community collaboration and 
coordination is being done through disaster healthcare coalitions. The coalition model can 
allow members to work together to identify resources for utilizing an alternate care site. 
The use of an ACS can mitigate medical surge during disasters with involvement by the 
whole community.  
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